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DNA exonerations have dramatically changed the conversation about the 
accuracy of the criminal justice system.  Fifty years ago, the widely shared view 
was that the system ensured no innocent defendants would be convicted.  As Judge 
Learned Hand famously complai?????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????1 But hundreds 
of DNA exonerations upended that conventional wisdom.  They demonstrated that 
juries have repeatedly found innocent defendants guilty.  If we have, on hundreds 
of occasions, convicted innocent people, then how do we correct those errors and 
how do we change the criminal justice system to avoid future wrongful 
convictions?
These important questions are taken up in Wrongful Convictions and the DNA 
Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing the Innocent,2 a nineteen-chapter 
volume, edited by Daniel S. Medwed.  The book explores the lessons we have 
learned in the twenty-five years since DNA first exonerated a wrongfully 
convicted defendant, and it identifies several challenges that still remain.  The 
book covers a wide array of topics, and it includes chapters from an all-star team of 
authors.  This breadth and expertise make the volume a good introduction to the 
reader who is unfamiliar with DNA exonerations, and it could easily serve as a 
textbook for a seminar on the topic.
Wrongful Convictions and the DNA Revolution offers significant detail about 
the specific types of errors that resulted in the conviction of innocent defendants. 
Those errors include flawed eyewitness identification procedures, coercive and 
suggestive interrogation practices, overzealousness on the part of prosecutors, and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
* ??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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1 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
2 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING 
THE INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017) [hereinafter WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION].
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poor lawyering by defense attorneys.3 In addition to these specific errors, the 
volume also gives great insight into the structural flaws that allowed these errors to 
accumulate and persist, such as the incentives for prosecutors to win cases,4 the 
incentives for innocent defendants to accept plea bargains,5 the massive caseloads 
and chronic underfunding of the criminal justice system,6 the decentralized nature 
of the system,7 and the limitations of constitutional litigation for changing the basic 
arrangement of how law enforcement and civilians interact.8
Because the volume includes chapters from multiple authors, it provides 
different perspectives on important issues.  For example, one question that divides 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????9 Should the term be reserved for 
only those individuals whose innocence have been proven by incontrovertible 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????10 The volume presents these opposing views, 
and the reader is better served by having both represented.
The presentation of opposing views is not limited to how broadly to define 
exoneration.  The volume also contains a chapter from Paul Cassell, which asks 
difficult questions about the tradeoffs associated with changing the criminal justice 
system to make wrongful convictions less likely.11 All changes to the criminal 
justice system, including changes that could prevent wrongful convictions, will 
involve tradeoffs.  For example, changing interrogation techniques to put less 
pressure on suspects may reduce the number of innocent defendants who falsely 
confess to crimes they did not commit.  But it may also reduce the number of 
guilty defendants who confess as well.12 ???????????????????????????thors appear 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 These are the factors that are most often correlated with a wrongful conviction.  See
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 40, 45?46.
4 George C. Thomas III, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocents, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 208, 210.
5 Id. at 210.
6 Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 85, 95.
7 Michael Meltsner, Innocence Before DNA, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 14, 15.
8 See id.
9 See Daniel S. Medwed, Talking About a Revolution: A Quarter Century of DNA 
Exonerations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 2, 3 ???????
book takes no universal stance on the most appropriate ?????????????????????????????????????????
10 Richard A. Leo, Has the Innocence Movement Become an Exoneration Movement? The 
Risks and Rewards of Redefining Innocence, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 57, 60.
11 Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on 
Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Trade-Offs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 264.
12 See id. at 275?76.
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to endorse all reforms that might protect the innocent, Cassell unflinchingly asks 
whether reforms that prevent conviction of the innocent will also lead to more 
acquittals of the guilty.
Although the volume is about DNA exonerations, the contributing authors 
emphasize that DNA is only one subplot in the broader story about problems with 
accuracy in the criminal justice system.  Keith Findley captures this sentiment well 
????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ? ?????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????????]
Movement, it no longer fully defines it.  It cannot be the future, at least not the 
???????????????????????????????????????????13 Other authors are quick to note that 
the nature of DNA evidence necessarily limits DNA exonerations to particular 
types of cases,14 and that the increasing availability of DNA tests for law 
enforcement is likely to decrease the number of those exonerations going 
forward.15 Indeed, a major premise of the book is that we must distill various 
lessons from DNA exonerations in order to improve the system for all cases.16
DNA exonerations exposed not simply the limits of former forensic testing, but 
also a series of other investigative shortcomings and systemic problems that 
contributed to wrongful convictions.  Until those other shortcomings and problems 
are remedied, the criminal justice system will continue to make inaccurate 
determinations about guilt, and innocent people will continue to be jailed for 
crimes that they did not commit.
I greatly enjoyed reading suggestions from such a diverse group of well-
respected authors about how to improve the system based on the lessons we have 
learned from DNA exonerations.  Unsurprisingly, different authors offer different 
solutions.  Some suggest that the exonerations may have undermined the
constitutionality of capital punishment.17 Others advocate expunging convictions 
from the Jim Crow South that were doubtlessly infected by racial bias.18 Others 
see DNA exonerations as an opportunity to reform other areas of the law, such as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 Keith A. Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 184, 185.
14 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
supra note 10, ??? ??? ????? ?????????? ??-90 percent of felony cases do not involve biological 
????????????
15 See, e.g., Leo, supra ????? ???? ??? ??? ??????????????? ????????? ???? ???????? ????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????supra note 9, at 13 ?????????????????????
ubiquitous at the front end of criminal cases, weeding out innocent suspects before cases even go to 
?????????
16 See Medwed, supra note 9, at 3 (??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17 Robert J. Smith, G. Ben Cohen & Zoë Robinson, What Does Innocence Have to Do With 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra
note 2, at 159.
18 Margaret Burnham, Retrospective Justice in the Age of Innocence: The Hard Case of Rape 
Executions, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 291.
274 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:271
the law of war19 or animal rights,20 or as an opportunity for different types of 
clinical education.21
???????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ? ?????? ?????????? ????????
offers a thoughtful case for targeting arson convictions and other cases involving 
junk science.22 ????????????????? ???????? ?ffers a practical improvement on the 
legal standard that governs ineffective assistance of counsel claims.23 Rob 
????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ????????????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????
prosecutorial practices involving perjury charges.24 And the chapter by Sandra 
Guerra Thompson and Robert Wicoff offers important suggestions on how to 
respond to systemic criminal justice failures, such as fraud by forensic scientists.25
Despite this collection of thoughtful and practical suggestions for reform, I 
finished the volume less optimistic about the chances that significant criminal 
justice reform will occur.26 DNA exonerations and the attention they have 
received have changed assumptions about the infallibility of the criminal justice 
system.  Although DNA exonerations have changed public opinion about whether 
innocent defendants are convicted, that change in opinion has not led to a 
????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ???????? ? ?????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????
recognize that innocent defendants are convicted with some regularity,27 but 
society does not seem willing to do much to avoid convicting more innocents in 
the future.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 Erik Luna, Innocence at War, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION,
supra note 2, at 379.
20 Justin F. Marceau & Steven M. Wise, Exonerating the Innocent: Habeas for Nonhuman 
Animals, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 334.
21 Jacqueline McMurtrie, A Tale of Two Innocence Clinics: Client Representation and 
Legislative Advocacy, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 117.
22 See Findley, supra note 133.
23 Adele Bernhard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Innocence Revolution: A 
Standards-Based Approach, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at
226, 235?40.
24 Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 106.
25 Sandra Guerra Thompson & Robert Wicoff, Outbreaks of Injustice: Responding to 
Systemic Irregularities in the Criminal Justice System, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 314.
26 To be clear, I am less optimistic about significant reforms that will protect the innocent 
from conviction.  There are also other reforms that the criminal justice system should undertake, 
including reforms that would address racial disparity within the system and disproportionately high 
levels of incarceration in this country.  Those reforms are beyond the scope of this essay.
27 Marvin Zalman, Matthew J. Larson & Brad Smith, Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Wrongful 
Convictions, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 51, 57 (2012) (reporting that a quarter of survey respondents 
????????? ????? ????????? ???????????? ????????? ????? ?????? ????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ?????-quarters 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Stephanie Roberts Hartung illustrates this problem in her chapter on post-
conviction procedure.28 Hartung complains that, as compared to improvements 
that have been made in the pretrial and trial context, very few reforms have 
occurred in the post-conviction realm.29 But reading through the pretrial and trial 
reforms she identified,30 one wonders whether Hartung could have set a lower bar.  
Take eyewitness identification, which has been identified as a leading factor 
present in cases of wrongful conviction.31 Despite widespread recognition of the 
unreliability of prevailing practices, and despite national guidelines promulgated 
by the National Institute of Justice in 1999, only ten states have reformed police 
lineup procedures.32 Interrogation procedures have not fared much better.  Despite 
the prevalence of false confessions resulting from coercive and suggestive 
interrogation procedures, fewer than twenty states have required law enforcement 
to videotape interrogations.33
Hartung is not the only author who highlights how little progress has been 
made.  Adele Bernhard’s chapter on defense attorneys also paints a bleak picture.34
As she notes, “the DNA exoneration dataset show[s] that poor defense lawyering is 
a major factor in the conviction of the innocent.”35 Yet despite the increased 
attention to both wrongful convictions and poor defense lawyering in the wake of 
the DNA revolution, little has changed.  Indigent defense is still shamefully 
underfunded,36 and the quality of defense representation remains poor.37 And, as 
Bernhard demonstrates, the courts have continued to apply exactingly high 
standards of review to ineffective assistance claims.  So even though judges now 
know for certain that an ineffective defense attorney can significantly increase the 
chances of an innocent person being convicted, those judges are still unlikely to 
grant a new trial to a defendant with a hopelessly bad lawyer.38 As a solution, 
                                                                                                                                                   
28 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in Innocence 
Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 247.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 248–50.
31 Garrett, supra note 3, at 46.  See also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 9, 48 (2011) (reporting that 76% of a large dataset of 
exonerated defendants had been misidentified by eyewitnesses).
32 Hartung, supra note 28, at 249.  Local law enforcement agencies appear to have made at 
least some progress, albeit at a slow pace.  But Hartung reports that fewer than half of all departments 
have made any of the reforms suggested by the NIJ.  Id.
33 Id. at 249–50.
34 See Bernhard, supra note 23.
35 Id. at 226.
36 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 17–18, 38 (2004).
37 See id. at 14–17, 39.
38 See Bernhard, supra note 23, at 231–35 (concluding, after a study of ineffective assistance 
claims, that “[w]hatever concerns the federal courts may have about wrongly convicting innocent 
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Bernhard suggests that, rather than trying to craft an ineffective assistance standard 
that is primarily concerned with preserving flexibility and autonomy for defense 
counsel, courts should instead adopt a checklist approach to representation.39 That 
our current ineffective assistance doctrine is incapable of capturing those lawyers 
?????? ??????????????? ????????? ?? ???????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??????40 shows how 
meaningless our current legal standards are.  And it is a sad illustration of the fact 
that the judiciary has, for decades, failed to demand more from members of the 
bar.
??????? ????????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ??? ????
other side of the adversarial system.  Thomas conducted a study of the impact of 
prosecutorial errors on wrongful convictions.41 ????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ????? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????42 One innocent 
defendant spent 15 years in prison because the state could not keep track of 
evidence.43 Thomas suggests that these latter cases were more depressing than the 
cases of affirmative prosecutorial conduct.44 I agree.
These examples of incompetence are so disheartening because they expose 
the negligence and incompetence that many of us suspect is all too common in the 
criminal justice system.  No one thinks that such incompetence is acceptable.  And 
yet, the courts have repeatedly excused such incompetence rather than creating 
incentives for law enforcement to hold themselves to higher standards.45
Incompetence, whether systemic or occasional, will obviously undermine the 
????????? ???????? ????????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ???????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
people, those concerns are ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39 Id. at 235?40.
40 Id. at 236, 239.
41 See Thomas, supra note 4.
42 Id. at 213.
43 The defendant spent ten years in prison before persuading a court that a DNA test was 
necessary; then he spent another fifteen years in prison waiting for the sheriff to find the evidence.  
Id.
44 ??? ??????? ????? ????? ??????g these summaries [of a random sample of cases from the 
????????????????????? ?????????? ??? ?? ??????????? ????????? ? ????? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ????
cases of overreaching that are depressing but the kind of routine mistakes that condemn innocent 
de???????????????????????????????Id.
45 The Court has declined to create incentives for police officers to know the content of the 
criminal law, see Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not forbid seizur???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
incentives to maintain accurate warrants database, see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 
(2009) (refusing to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an arrest based on an invalid warrant that 
had not been removed from a law enforcement database), or incentives for prosecutors to train their 
attorneys on what evidence disclosures are constitutionally required, see Connick v. Thompson, 563 
U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (holding that prior, unrelated Brady violations did not create a duty for elected 
district attorney to conduct further training of line prosecutors).
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Without more resources and better incentives, such incompetence is likely to 
continue.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
insufficient res???????????????????????????????????????????????46 But the chances of 
more resources being devoted to the criminal justice system?especially on the 
front end, rather than toward corrections?are, as Cassell notes, quite slim.47
Cassell makes a strong case that, in a system with severely constrained 
resources, vindicating constitutional rights comes at the expense of protecting the 
innocent from conviction.48 Defense attorneys with limited time and resources will 
prioritize a suppression motion above a rigorous factual investigation, and 
legislatures eager to stem the tide of constitutional litigation will limit post-
conviction review that could free the innocent.  Cassell thus argues that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vindicating 
claims of factual innocence.  Specifically, he suggests shifting resources away 
from litigating Fourth Amendment exclusionary claims, Miranda claims, and post-
conviction claims of a purely legal nature.49 All of these claims involve 
vindicating ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ??? ?? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ????????? ???
prioritize the innocent seems intuitively correct.  But the nature of this choice 
should not be sugar-coated: it trades rights and values ordinarily associated with 
justice in order to have more resources to devote to the pursuit of truth.  Can such a 
system legitimately call itself a criminal justice system?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????onstitutional rights 
seems correct is that our criminal justice system exists in order to sort the guilty 
from the innocent.  But this foundational premise?that the system exists to sort 
the innocent from the guilty?takes a serious beating in the chapter by Alexandra 
Natapoff.50 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
engaged in a quest for accuracy based on evidence in the first instance.  Instead, it 
is engaged in bargaining.  The plea bargaining process has turned evidence and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????51 ?????????????????
discussion is not simply a commentary on plea bargaining or on the limits of 
forensic evidence.  It is a commentary on the modern criminal justice system.  To 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
46 Cassell, supra note 11, at 273.
47 Id. at 274.
48 Id. at 273?74.
49 Id. at 272?77.  Cassell also suggests that defense counsel attempt to ascertain which of their 
clients are actually innocent, and to focus their efforts on those clients.  Id. at 277?80.  This 
suggestion also prioritizes innocence over constitutional rights, as it would decrease the assistance of 
counsel for the guilty in order to provide more assistance to the innocent.
50 See Natapoff, supra note 6.
51 Id. at 86.
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understand this commentary, it is important to take a step back and consider how 
plea bargaining operates.
Plea bargaining allows the state to impose punishment without having to incur 
the time and expense associated with trial.  The system works well for guilty
defendants who would likely be convicted at trial.  Those defendants receive a 
shorter sentence in return for waiving their right to a trial.  And the system has 
ensured that most guilty defendants will gladly plead rather than proceed to trial.   
Legislatures routinely increase the punishment associated with conviction at trial 
so that prosecutors have leverage to induce guilty pleas.52 Indeed, legislatures 
often enact criminal statutes based on an explicit assumption that the parties will 
plea bargain. For example, in the recent debates over whether to lessen mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug offenders, reform opponents argued that it was 
necessary to maintain current penalties, not because they represented appropriate 
punishments, but rather so that prosecutors could use those penalties as leverage to 
obtain guilty pleas.53 This arrangement has proven quite effective.  Currently, 
nearly ninety-five percent of convictions are the result of guilty pleas, rather than 
trials.54
But the quest for efficiency in the modern criminal justice system does not 
target only the guilty defendants.  Innocent defendants face the same harsh laws 
and the same plea bargaining dynamics.  Imagine, for example, an innocent 
defendant who has been indicted for committing a crime that carries a penalty of 
five years imprisonment.  Prosecutors do not simply indict random people, so there 
is at least some evidence suggesting that the defendant committed the crime.  
Unless she can produce enough evidence of her innocence to convince the 
prosecutor to drop the charges, a defendant must choose whether to proceed to trial 
or accept a plea bargain.  The rational decision will depend on the chances that she 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
52 See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading 
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1401?02 (2003).
53 Senator Chuck Grassley opposed legislation that would have reduced 20-year, 10-year, and 
five-year mandatory minimums for drug offenses to 10 years, five years, and two years, respectively.  
He justified his opposition, in part, on the fact that prosecutors were not seeking those penalties in all 
cases, and so the sentences were, on average, appropriate.  He noted that:
[J]ust under half of all drug courier offenders were subject to mandatory minimum 
sentences, but under 10 percent were subject to mandatory minimum sentences at the 
time of their sentencing.
. . .
That is an intended goal of current Federal sentencing policy, to put pressure on 
defendants to cooperate in exchange for a lower sentence so evidence against more 
responsible criminals can be attained.  As a result, even for drug couriers the average 
sentence is 39 months.  That seems to be an appropriate level.
161 CONG. REC. S963 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
54 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????-seven percent of federal convictions 
and ninety-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450 tbl.5.46 (31st ed. 2005)) ??Pleas account for 
??????????????????????????????????????????
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will be convicted and the bargain that the prosecutor is offering.  If she estimates 
that she has an 80% chance of acquittal at trial, she should accept any plea bargain 
that offers her less than one year in prison.55
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
plea bargaining or the values that underlie it.  The centrality of plea bargaining is 
well recognized by both criminal justice actors56 and those who study the system.57
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
DNA exonerations.  That juxtaposition left me pondering whether the very concept 
of exonerations is out of place in the modern criminal justice system long after I 
finished reading the volume.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the false promise of reforming the system in light of the lessons learned from DNA 
exonerations.  DNA exonerations captured the attention of the public because they 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
basic function?separating the innocen???????????????????58 ???????????????????????
reminds us that we have largely abandoned that basic function of the system.  Ours 
is now a system of plea bargains rather than a system of trials.59 Plea bargaining 
?????????????????????????????????????????????ficiency.60 Plea bargaining puts a 
price tag on sorting the innocent from the guilty, and it makes that price too high 
for most defendants.  The implicit message of plea bargaining is that, because trials 
are expensive, we should avoid them, even at the cost of convicting innocent 
defendants.
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
55 The rational actor model tells us that the defendant would want to accept this bargain 
because it represents the expected punishment???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ? ????????? ??? ??????????? Plea Bargaining and 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1988).  For more on plea bargaining and the 
rational actor model, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, 
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (2007) (describing the rational actor paradigm in plea 
bargaining and explaining why it may not capture the reality of the negotiation between prosecutor 
and defense counsel).
56 See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
. . . is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is ??????????????????????????????; Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ??The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
57 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
652 (1981); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining 
as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the 
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
58 Leo, supra note 10, at 59.
59 See Bibas, supra note 57????????????Plea bargaining is no longer a negligible exception to 
???????????????????????????????????????
60 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 87.
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In contrast to the message of plea bargaining, the message in the wake of the 
DNA exonerations is that we may be able to improve the ability of our system to 
sort the innocent from the guilty.  Implicit in this hope of improving our ability to 
????? ???? ????????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ????? ??????? ????? ???? ????????? ??????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????61 But the prevalence of plea 
bargaining and the dynamics that have made trial an unaffordable luxury for even 
innocent defendants tell us the opposite.  They show that our desire for efficiency 
has supplanted the original goal of the criminal justice system?to punish the 
guilty while protecting the innocent.62
??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????e system and the ability of DNA 
exonerations to improve the system is not limited to plea bargaining.  She also 
points to misdemeanor prosecutions?which vastly outnumber felony 
prosecutions63?as further proof that our system cares more about shuffling people
through the system than using the system to seek the truth.64 The misdemeanor 
system regularly uses pretrial detention to coerce pleas on charges that would have 
resulted in little or no jail time had the defendant been convicted at trial.65 And 
when defense attorneys do attempt to litigate in misdemeanor courts, some judges 
are openly hostile to their efforts.  Natapoff recounts the experience of Eve 
Brensike Primus, a defense attorney turned law professor, who was told by a judge 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
61 Id. at 97.
62 I am, of course, hardly the first to make these observations about efficiency and market 
forces.  Stephanos Bibas, for example, has criticized the free market defense of plea bargaining 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d
??????????? ?????????????????????????? ?STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 
???????? ? ??????? ?????? ????????????? ????? ????? ???????? ????????????????????? ??????????-inspired 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???????? ???????? ??????? ????????????
??????????????????????????DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND 
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 63, 66 (2016).  As to the efficiency value, many have 
noted that prioritizing efficiency in the criminal justice system is both troubling and pernicious.  See, 
e.g., BIBAS, supra?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????oser 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
63 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314?15 (2012) (noting 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
64 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 94?96.  See also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
earning nicknames such as cattle herding, assembly-????????????????????? ????????????
65 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95.  See also Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, 
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 747, 771 
(2017) (reporting that misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial are more likely to be 
convicted and more likely to receive sentences of jai?? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ????????????
defendants . . . who pleaded guilty would not have been convicted at all had they been released 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a result of their detention and are therefore more likely to accede to and receive sentences of 
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to save her substantive arguments for appeal.66 Natapoff also recounts how 
misdemeanor defendants have, on numerous occasions, been convicted for 
innocuous conduct that appellate courts had previously held not to be illegal.67
Whatever modest reforms DNA exonerations have prompted are nowhere to 
be seen in either plea bargaining dynamics or the misdemeanor system.  Nor is 
there much hope that the exonerations will change these systems in the future.  
DNA is simply not an issue in the vast majority of cases.68 And even if DNA 
exonerations were to change investigative techniques, such as eyewitness 
identifications and interrogation procedures, those techniques often are not 
employed in misdemeanor cases.  Loitering, trespassing, and other common 
misdemeanors rely only on police observation, rather than investigative 
techniques.69
DNA testing is unlikely to have much effect on plea bargaining either.  Some 
(though notably not all) states permit defendants who pleaded guilty to obtain post-
conviction DNA testing.70 But the essentially unlimited bargaining power given to 
prosecutors allows them to easily circumvent these post-conviction safeguards.  
???????????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
DNA testing,71 and they can also require defendants to waive any rights to appeal 
or to otherwise challenge their convictions.72 There are plenty of examples of 
innocent defendants who have pleaded guilty rather than wait for DNA testing 
because prosecutors refused to keep the plea bargain offer open until the tests came 
back and defendants knew the results might be inconclusive.73
Wrongful Convictions and the DNA Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing 
the Innocent is an ambitious and important book.  It not only provides a thorough 
and nuanced overview of DNA exonerations, it also challenges the reader to 
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66 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95 (citing Eve Brensike Primus, Our Broken Misdemeanor 
Justice System: Its Problems and Some Potential Solutions, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 80, 81 
(2012)).
67 Natapoff, supra note 6, at 95?96.
68 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
69 ?[U]nlike serious offenses of burglary, rape or h?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ?? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????????
?????????????????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ????????? ??????????? ???????????
supra note 63, at 1346.
70 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 955 n.14 (2012) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
71 See id. at 958 (documenting DNA waivers and noting that, if challenged, courts are likely 
to uphold such waivers).
72 See Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice 
System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015) (conducted 
?????? ????????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????
constitutional claims regardless of whether such violations occurred pre-trial, during the entry of a 
guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing??????????????????
73 See, e.g., Buffey v. Ballard, 236 W. Va. 509 (2015).
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consider whether real criminal justice reform is possible.  While some chapters 
take an optimistic approach to the question of reform, others paint a much more 
troubling picture.  To be clear, the pessimistic messages in these chapters by 
Hartung, Bernhard, Thomas, Cassell, and Natapoff are a reason to read this 
volume, not a reason to avoid it.  Those who wish to educate themselves about the 
criminal justice system will invariably learn things that are discomforting.  Our 
system is far from perfect, and there are many reasons that reform has repeatedly 
stalled.
Indeed, that reform remains elusive may be one of the most important lessons 
that we can learn from DNA exonerations.  Those exonerations upended the 
conventional wisdom about the accuracy of the criminal justice system, proving 
that our system has repeatedly failed to sort the innocent from the guilty, and 
highlighting various features of the current system that almost certainly impair 
accurate determinations of guilt in cases without DNA evidence.  But changing 
public opinion about the fallibility of the criminal justice system has not been 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
we demand investigative changes from law enforcement, ensure effective 
assistance from defense attorneys, refuse to tolerate incompetence and inattention 
from prosecutors, devote more resources to criminal justice, and renounce 
efficiency as the driving value in criminal cases.
